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Abstract 
This paper extends the traditional focus of active labor market policy evaluation from a static 
comparison of participation in a program versus nonparticipation (or participation in another 
program) to the evaluation of the effects of program sequences, i.e. multiple participation or 
timing of such programs. We use a dynamic evaluation framework that explicitly allows for 
dynamic selection into different stages of such sequences based on past intermediate 
outcomes to analyze multiple programs, the timing of programs, and the order of programs. 
The analysis is based on exceptionally comprehensive data on the Austrian labor force. Our 
findings suggest that (i) active job search programs are more effective after a qualification 
program compared to the reverse order, that (ii) multiple participations in qualification 
measures dominates single participation, and that (iii) the effectiveness of specific labor 
market programs deteriorates the later they start during an unemployment spell.  
Keywords 
Active Labor market policy, matching estimation, program evaluation, panel data. 
 
JEL Classification 
J68 1  Introduction  
For the last twenty years, a steadily growing number of active labor market policy evaluation 
studies have been conducted for Europe.
1 So far, the majority of studies concentrated on the 
impact of a single program compared to nonparticipation or to participation in other pro-
grams. In this study, we extend this focus to issues of multiple participations, as well as the 
timing of active labor market programs. 
Overall, conclusions about the effects of active labor market programs in Europe are mixed. 
Apart from differences at the country level, there seems to be a broad consensus about effect 
heterogeneity  with  respect  to  the  type  of  the  program,
2  but  also  with  respect  to  program 
participants.
3  The  majority  of  studies  concentrate  on  a  comparison  of  participation  in  a 
particular program versus nonparticipation or participation in another program, either at one 
point in time or in the same time span. Until recently, little was known about the effects of 
differential timing of labor market programs or about the effects of program sequences, i.e. 
multiple participation in the same program, or different programs. An exception is Carling 
and Richardson (2004), who estimate the impact of labor market programs on subsequent 
unemployment for Sweden. In a duration modeling framework they find that the duration un-
til program entry has no impact on the estimated hazard rates. Another example is Sianesi 
(2004) who groups Swedish labor market programs according to the length of the respective 
                                            
1   For a survey on active labor market  policies in Europe see Kluve et al. (2007), as well as the summaries given in 
Heckmann, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). 
2   For job creation schemes in Switzerland see Gerfin and Lechner (2002). Similar results appear in Lechner and Wunsch 
(2006) and in Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomson (2004, 2006a,b) for Germany. For wage or integration subsidies in Sweden 
see Sianesi (2002) and Forslund, Johannson, and Lindqvist (2004), and for Switzerland Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller 
(2002) and Gerfin, Lechner, and Steiger (2005). For business start-up programs, we refer to Carling and Gustafson (1999). 
For training measures, comprising formal qualification, further training of any kind, and retraining see Richardson and van 
den Berg (2001) for Sweden, Gerfin and Lechner (2002) for Switzerland, and Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2005) for 
Germany. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) investigate long-run effects and Lechner and Wunsch (2006) analyze 
business cycle effects. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996), Hofer and Weber (2004a, b), and Lutz, Mahringer, and 
Pöschl (2005) investigate employment effects for different instruments of the Austrian ALMP.   1 
unemployment spell before the program. She finds that earlier allocation increases subsequent 
employment  prospects.  Fitzenberger  and  Speckesser  (2005,  2007a,  2007b)  adopt  this  ap-
proach for Germany and find similar results. However, a particular problem of that approach 
is that at any point in time 'starting' participants are compared with 'not yet' participants. 
Therefore, the implicit counterfactual changes as time moves on, which makes the interpreta-
tion  of  the  estimated quantities  difficult.  Flores-Lagunes,  Gonzalez,  and  Neumann  (2007) 
estimate average causal effects of different lengths of the exposure to Job Corps (JC) training 
in the U.S. They suspect that the length of a program is potentially influenced by personal 
characteristics or by the participant's history on the labor market at any point in time. Thus, 
they use the idea of the 'generalized propensity score', i.e. the assumption that the length of 
the individual’s JC spell is randomly assigned, conditional on a rich set of covariates. They 
find a hump shaped positive relation between the program length and weekly earnings for 
their white and Hispanic subsamples. 
In contrast to the methodology used by those papers mentioned above, Robins (1986) first 
suggests an explicitly dynamic causal framework based on potential outcomes that allows for 
the definition of causal effects of dynamic interventions and systematically addresses this type 
of selection problem. By specifying the potential outcomes explicitly, and thus defining the 
counterfactuals  of  interest,  he  avoids  the  ambiguity  of  the  approach  proposed  by  Sianesi 
(2004). His approach is extended in several dimensions in subsequent work
4 and frequently 
applied  in  epidemiology  and  biostatistics  as  for  example  in  Robins,  Greenland,  and  Hu 
(1999), Hernan, Brumback, Robins (2001), Keiding (2001), and Murphy (2003). It is a major 
advantage of this approach that it allows the systematic use of time varying control variables 
that are partly affected by the program participations under investigation. In this paper, we 
                                                                                                                                    
3   See Puhani (1999) and Kluve, Lehmann, and Schmidt (1999, 2004) for Poland, Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins 
(1997) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) for the US and other western economies. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 
(2004,2007) for Germany, as well as a survey by Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) for gender specific differences.   2 
deviate slightly from that literature as we rely on the identification results for parameters that 
are typically of interest in evaluation studies, but not necessarily so in biometrical studies (see 
Lechner and Miquel, 2001). 
We use comprehensive administrative labor market data from Austria to evaluate a variety of 
program sequences to answer questions that are not restricted to the timing issue per se, but 
also relate to the issue of multiple participations in programs of a different or the same kind. 
Therefore, this paper is probably the first labor market evaluation study that deals with the 
issue of a dynamic program allocation for the case that participation in a later stage of a se-
quence may depend on earlier stages of the sequence and on intermediate outcomes of the 
latter. Among other results, we find that earlier program allocation dominates allocation in a 
later stage of the unemployment spell. Furthermore, active job search programs are more ef-
fective after participating in a qualification measure, and less effective before such a program.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes key features of the Austrian 
labor market and sketches the institutional setting. In Section 3, we introduce the data, discuss 
the underlying identification strategy, and provide a descriptive analysis of the participants of 
the various program sequences under consideration. Estimation is discussed in Section 4. The 
results of the estimation and a brief sensitivity analysis are provided in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  An  internet  appendix  with  supplementary  material  is  available  at  the  internet 
(www.siaw/lechner/at). 
2  The Austrian labor market - development and institutions 
Compared to other European countries, Austria has experienced a rather low and stable un-
employment rate over the last decade after Austria's EU entry in 1995. In Figure 1 we observe 
a slight decrease of the unemployment rate between 1998 and 2000 with a subsequent con-
                                                                                                                                    
4   For example see Robins (1989, 1997, 1999), Robins, Greenland, and Hu (1999) for discrete treatments, and Gill and   3 
vergence to the former level of about 5.9 percent. Only Switzerland features an unemploy-
ment rate that is lower over the entire observation period. In recent years also Denmark and 
Sweden undercut the Austrian unemployment rate.  
The objectives for the Austrian government in fighting unemployment are legally defined in 
the Public Employment Service Act. In particular, they comprise (i) matching job seekers and 
vacancies efficiently, (ii) removing any barrier that prevents this matching, (iii) increasing the 
flow  of  information  about  potential  matches,  (iv)  mitigating  quantitative  and  qualitative 
differences between labor demand and supply, (v) securing existing jobs, and (vi) providing 
funds for the unemployed in the case of a job loss. These goals are pursued by means of a 
wide range of passive and active labor market policies.  

















Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany
Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland
 
      Note: Data are extracted from the OECD Economic Outlook Database 2006.  
Passive labor market policy in Austria covers earnings losses caused by various types of non-
employment. To receive unemployment benefit (UB) payments the unemployed have to be 
registered at the Public Employment Service (PES), be eligible and willing to work, and have 
a  predefined  record  of  employment  with  social  insurance  contributions  as  summarized  in 
Table 1. The standard entitlement period is 20 weeks with a replacement ratio of 55 percent of 
                                                                                                                                    
Robins (2001) for continuous treatments.   4 
the former net wage. After UB expiry, the unemployed receive unemployment assistance 
which is means-tested, but has to be re-approved every 12 months. 
Table 1: Unemployment benefit duration as a function of contribution time and age 
 
Contribution 
time in weeks 
Prior relevant 
time in months 
Entitlement in 
weeks  Age restriction 
1st application  52  24  20   no 
Further  applications  28  12  20   no 
Prolongations  156  60  30   no 
.  312  120  39  >=40 
.  468  180  52  >=50 
.  780  300  78  >=60 
Standard replacement ratio:   55% of the former net earnings 
Family premium  Granted for dependent family members. Maximum 
overall replacement ratio:  80% of the former net 
earnings. 
Unemployment assistance:  After UB exhaustion (means tested, but no maxi-
mum entitlement period) 
 
Table 2 shows that active labor market policies (ALMP) can be distinguished into four cate-
gories - orientation measures, training measures, subsidized employment, and others. Training 
measures comprise a variety of programs from active job search to different forms of qualifi-
cation partially combined with on-the-job-training elements. The PES either provides pro-
grams directly or supports external providers with financial grants. 
Due to data restrictions, we are unable to distinguish qualification measures and course subsi-
dies further. Subsidized employment comprises employment in a quasi-realistic work envi-
ronment, business start-up measures, and integration subsidies. In addition, the PES also of-
fers qualification measures for employed individuals that are not in the focus of this study. 
Overall expenditures for active labor market policies have steadily grown since 1996 and cur-
rently amount to approximately 0.6 percent of the Austrian GDP. Since the dynamic treatment 
evaluation approach is very data consuming, we focus on the four largest programs - orienta-
tion, qualification, active job search, and course subsidies.    5 
Beginning in 2000, the strategy of the Austrian PES changed from allocating single programs 
to the concept of defining program sequences.
 In February 2001, this strategy was constituted 
as new component in the 'Guiding Principle of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor'.  
Table 2: Active labor market policies - overview 
Program  Abbreviation  Purpose 
Orientation measures*  OM  Assessment of the individual situation and aptitude 
=> upfront decision process for further actions. 
Training 
Active job search*  AJS  Improvement of job acquisition skills, like interview training, 
etc. 
Qualification measures*  QM  Broad class of qualification programs endowing participants 
with basic skills up to formal vocational degrees. Providers 
are connected to the PES by upfront arrangements about a 
fixed number of participants. 
Course subsidies*  CS  Financial support for courses of external providers, i.e. not 
connected to the PES as for QM. 
Job coaching  JC  Combination of counseling, qualification and on the job train-
ing for individuals with specific placement handicaps, like 
disabled persons. 
Subsidized employment 
Business start-up programs  BSP  Support for participants from an initial business idea, which is 
worth being realized, until the actual foundation. 
Socio-economic enterprise and  
non-profit sector projects 
SEE & NPS  Subsidized employment in a quasi-realistic work environment 
for individuals with bad re-integration prospects. 
Integration subsidies  IS  Temporary wage subsidies (up to 100%) for the first 150 
days of a new employment. 
Others 
Qualification for employees  QFE  Qualification measures for employed individuals. 
Beneficences for labor  BFL  Collaboration with local firms in order to compensate sudden 
excess supply or demand of workers caused by business 
foundations or sudden plant closures. 
   Note:   Measures with an asterisk are considered in the empirical analysis for reasons explained in the next section.  
As a consequence, the overall number of program sequences within one unemployment period 
increased significantly, i.e. the number of program sequences within one unemployment pe-
riod rose from 12'861 in 2000 to 23'560 in 2001. This approach has remained an important 
strategy for the PES ever since. This institutional feature in combination with the availability 
of data for the entire Austrian workforce enables us to identify groups of interesting program 
sequences that have a sufficiently large number of participants to apply the semi-parametric 
dynamic evaluation framework to be discussed below.   6 
3  Data and identification strategy 
3.1  Data 
As summarized in Table 3, the three data sources used in this study comprise administrative 
registers from the Federation of Austrian Social Insurance Institutions and the PES. The data 
sources are linked by a unique personal identifier. The set of variables in the last column of 
Table 3 are used to construct a multitude of additional variables covering the entire employ-
ment history until 1985 as well as a number of variables that are inevitable to control for, e.g. 
the  remaining  unemployment  benefit  claim  at  program  entry  or  the  pregnancy  status  for 
women, as is shown in Lechner and Wiehler (2007). 
Table 3: Administrative data used for the evaluation 
Data source  Contents  Time period  Variables 
Austrian Social  
Insurance Institutions 
Times of employment (including 
self- and minor employment, civil 
servants), times of unemployment, 
parental leave, retirement, and 
employer information 
1985-2005  age, gender, nationality, gross wage, 
economic branch and size of the 
employer (in persons), regional iden-
tifier. 
Austrian Public Employment 
Service (PES) 
Times of unemployment, coun-
seling process, times of program 
participation 
1990-2005  age, gender, nationality, profession, 
desired profession, education, family 
status, disability, number of job of-
fers, type and duration of the pro-
gram. 
  
Information is available on a daily basis for the entire observation period. In a first step, we 
condense the information into a manageable form by aggregating the daily information into 2-
week intervals, which is still more precise than the monthly or quarterly data commonly used 
for such studies.   
3.2  Parameters of interest and their identification  
In this section, we introduce the parameters of interest, discuss key identification conditions, 
and provide the intuition why those identifying assumptions are likely to hold in this study. 
Consider a simple version of the dynamic selection problem: A group of people, unemployed   7 
in an initial period t0, may be either sent into a program (or not) in two subsequent periods (t1, 
t2). Participation in t1 does not exclude participation in t2. Denoting participation in a specific 
period with 1 and nonparticipation with 0, all individuals will experience one of the four pro-
gram sequences (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), or (1,1). The parameter of interest in this study will be the 
difference in outcomes for the different sequences and for a (target) population of individuals 
who have either been allocated to the program in t1 or not. This effect will be denoted as the 
dynamic average treatment effect for a subpopulation in one sequence, DATE(T). Of course, 
simply comparing mean outcomes at t > t2 does not identify any causal effect of the se-
quences as soon as selection into those sequences is non-random, i.e. participation status and 
future potential outcomes are correlated. There are many identification strategies that can be 
applied in the static case to resolve this issue. For example, Rubin (1974) shows how to re-
solve this selection problem by assuming conditional independence (or non-confoundedness). 
This assumption implies that program status and potential outcomes are independent given a 
set of covariates that jointly determine program participation and outcomes.
5  However, in the 
dynamic setting complexity increases as selection may happen in every period. Simply con-
trolling for the selection in t1 is not sufficient for identification anymore since selection in the 
second period t2 may depend on effects of program (non-) participation in t1. For that reason, 
based on the abovementioned body of work by Robins (beginning with Robins, 1986) and his 
coauthors, Lechner and Miquel (2001) formulate an additional conditional independence con-
dition for the allocation in t2 in order to identify the DATE(T). The latter authors label it the 
weak dynamic conditional independence assumption (WDCIA). It requires that selection into 
the program at t2 is independent of the potential future outcomes given the set of initial co-
variates, the program status the person experienced in t1, and a set of intermediate outcomes 
that result from program (non-) participation in t1. In other words, they require conditional 
independence in t1, using all relevant information prior to t1, but also conditional independ-
                                            
5   See also the extensive survey by Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) provide   8 
ence in t2, i.e. using the program status in t1 and all relevant information prior to t2, which may 
already be influenced by the first participation status. The intuition behind this approach is 
that if we observe all factors that drive the allocation decision in both t1 and t2 we can deter-
mine the potential outcome of a sequence for a population that did not take part in that par-
ticular sequence, but features the same distribution of characteristics at the two selection deci-
sion points in t1 and t2.
6 In the paradigm of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Lechner and Mi-
quel (2001) show that the WDCIA can also be formulated in terms of the conditional partici-
pation probabilities (propensity scores) in each selection step to provide identification of the 
respective dynamic effects.  
The plausibility of the WDCIA depends not only on the availability of a set of variables that 
drive program allocation in general, as described in Lechner and Wiehler (2007), but also 
crucially on the existence and observability of relevant intermediate outcomes. Hence, apart 
from the entire set of variables that are assessed to be important in a static framework, our 
data must provide information about time varying characteristics that are presumed to be the 
key driving factors of the dynamic program selection.  
First, the decision of a caseworker to send the unemployed to a (further) program will cer-
tainly hinge on the labor market prospects of the unemployed individual during a sequence. 
Since we observe the number of job offers at any point in time, we are able to approximate 
labor market prospects from the data. Second, the allocation will also be based on the inter-
mediate development of the unemployed person on the labor market until program entry, e.g. 
intermediate employment or intermediate time outside the labor force (OLF). Third, the se-
lection will most likely also be influenced by financial or other personal aspects of the unem-
ployed person, like the remaining unemployment benefit claim, times of parental leave or 
                                                                                                                                    
identification conditions for the multiple treatment case.   9 
even pregnancies. Since our data are very comprehensive and available on a daily basis, we 
are able to either observe or construct such factors at any point in time. Using 4-month win-
dows for the time structure of the sequences, as will be explained in the next section, also 
guarantees that our analysis is based on sufficient variation between the different stages of a 
sequence.  
3.3  Definition of the population and of the program sequences of interest 
For the dynamic program evaluation, we impose four key requirements on the program se-
quences and on the underlying population that we consider. First, the identification strategy 
strongly hinges on the existence of a long labor market history before the entry into unem-
ployment. Second, the follow-up period after the program sequence of interest should not be 
influenced by perturbing events like the possibility of (early) retirement. As a result of those 
arguments we concentrate on the age group of the labor force between 25 and 50 years of age. 
Third, the data must provide all relevant information about the selection at any stage of the 
program sequence. Fourth, since we employ semi-parametric estimation techniques, the num-
ber of observations in a program sequence under consideration has to be sufficiently large.  
Given the (time-) structure of the data and the respective information in Table 3, we focus on 
the first inflow of individuals from employment into unemployment or directly into a labor 
market program between 2000 and 2002 (labeled as the 'defining UE spell') for two reasons. 
We want to maximize the number of participants in each sequence and have a follow-up 
period of at least three years, which enables us to identify medium term effects. Table 4 sum-
marizes the requirements we impose on the data. We end up with 345.044 individuals who 
will be the basis for all further steps. However, so far the structure of the data is intractable for 
further investigations since individual unemployment careers differ considerably with respect 
                                                                                                                                    
6  Note that in this simple set-up the latter population is required to be defined only by the allocation in t1. Under WDCIA 
identification for populations that are defined by both programs in t1 and t2 is subject to some restrictions, as described in   10 
to program participation, as well as with respect to the timing of the programs. Therefore, it is 
hard to find a group of people who experienced a sequence of the same order and timing on a 
2-week grid. Looking at Table 5, the average time between two programs is approximately 4 
months. A third or even a fourth program starts roughly four and eight months later. Hence, 
we recode our data into 4-month periods denoted as trimesters from now on.
7  
Table 4: Population reduction criterions 
Criterion  Remaining individuals 
All persons who switch into unemployment for the first time between 2000 and 2002  831.027 
Unemployment without a recall guarantee (i.e. no temporary layoffs)  615.849 
Age at unemployment entry between 25 and 50  395.168 
Duration of the last employment > 2 months  345.044 
Note:   Previous employment has to be longer than 2 months to exclude individuals in subsidized employment who feature a 
short period of unsubsidized employment (usually a couple of days) in the subsidized firm before re-entering unem-
ployment again.  
Table 5: Average time between two consecutive programs 
Mean difference between the i th and the j th consecutive program in months 
i \ j  2  3  4 
1  4.5  8.5  11.8 
2  --  4.3  7.9 
3  --  --  4.1 
Note:   Average time between two consecutive programs for the first two years after 
entry into the defining unemployment spell. 
Having determined the population and the time structure of the data, the next step is to define 
program sequences suitable for our analysis. A program sequence is a chronology of trimes-
ters in the first year after the entry into the defining unemployment spell. The crucial require-
ment is that we have to be able to pin down all selections along the sequence by means of a 
set of time invariant covariates and a set of time dependent outcomes which were labeled as 
intermediate outcomes in the previous section. Sequences are denoted in brackets with the 
abbreviations used in Table 2. As an example, a sequence of one year with an initial partici-
pation in a qualification measure followed by two trimesters of unemployment will be labeled 
                                                                                                                                    
Lechner (2007). 
7  Within each trimester we prioritize the spells that define the entire period as before, i.e. program participation followed by 
unemployment and employment. Whenever we find two or more programs within a trimester, we pick the last program as 
the defining one. Note that the defining spell does not need to cover the whole 4-month window.    11 
as (QM,UE,UE). A single (program) status in brackets, e.g. (AJS) or (UE), denotes partici-
pants in active job search or unemployment in the first trimester. 
3.4  A descriptive analysis of the selection into the program sequences  
Tables 6 and 7 illustrate mean characteristics for those participants per sequence that fulfill 
our requirements described above. The upper part contains time varying variables and the 
lower part time invariant variables. Table 6 shows the set of sequences that deal with the issue 
of program order and multiple program allocations. The first two columns contain participants 
who either received a qualification measure before (QM,OM) or after an orientation measure 
(OM, QM). In (OM,QM) we observe 20% more women. Consequently, such participants 
have spent more time in parental leave beforehand. They feature lower remaining benefit 
claims  at  the  entry  into  the  second  trimester  and  have  less  often  a  vocational  degree. 
Participants in an active job search program before (AJS,QM) or after a qualification measure 
(QM,AJS) are similar, except that participants of (AJS,QM) have a higher fraction of preg-
nant participants and exhausted benefit claims before the second trimester, desire a vocational 
change more frequently, and are less often married at the beginning of the unemployment 
spell. Comparing unemployed who participated in qualification measures twice in the first 
two trimesters (QM, QM, UE) to those who experienced only one measure (QM,UE,UE), we 
observe that the latter have a vocational degree more often and are characterized by shorter 
times of previous employment and a higher fraction of exhausted benefit claims right before 
the third trimester. The fraction of pregnant participants right before the second trimester is 
lower for (QM,QM, UE). This group also has a higher fraction of singles. A similar picture 
results from the comparison of participating in two course subsidies (CS,CS,UE) compared to 
one (CS,UE,UE), both followed by employment.   12 
Table 6: Mean characteristics of selected variables per sequence  - order and frequency 
Sequence  QM,OM  OM,QM  AJS,QM  QM,AJS  QM,QM,UE  QM,UE,UE  CS,CS,UE  CS,UE,UE 
Cases  146  275  734  275  265  790  166  557 
Intermediate outcomes                 
Just before the second trimester of the sequence                 
    Intermediate time in employment (in months)   0.05  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.35  0.04  0.47 
    Number of transitions between UE and E  0.07  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.14  0.07  0.21 
    Share affected by intermediate employment (in %)  1.07  4.14  1.36  1.45  1.89  13.0  4.05  18.8 
    Intermediate time 'out of labor force' (in months)  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.14  0.03  0.14 
    UB benefit exhausted (in %)  8.97  11.79  6.68  5.82  6.04  10.00  7.51  8.80 
    Cumulated job offers  1.83  1.64  1.72  1.80  1.23  2.10  3.09  3.05 
    Pregnant just before defining state (in %)  0.69  1.07  0.27  0.00  0.75  1.90  1.16  1.08 
Just before the third trimester of the sequence                 
    Intermediate time in employment (in months)   --   --   --   --  0.18  1.25  0.32  1.30 
    Number of transitions between UE and E   --   --   --   --  0.09  0.50  0.19  0.60 
    Share affected by intermediate employment (in %)   --   --   --   --  5.66  32.9  12.7  36.8 
    Intermediate time 'out of labor force' (in months)   --   --   --   --  0.06  0.32  0.18  0.30 
    UB benefit exhausted (in %)   --   --   --   --  9.43  25.95  15.61  23.52 
    Cumulated job offers   --   --   --   --  1.53  4.16  3.31  5.73 
    Pregnant just before defining state (in %)   --   --   --   --  1.51  2.28  2.31  2.15 
                 
Time invariant characteristics                 
Personal characteristics (in %)                 
    Female  59.31  80.00  63.90  61.82  66.04  61.39  57.80  52.96 
    Age at UE entry (in years)  37.27  36.59  37.29  38.37  35.58  37.23  37.16  37.44 
    Foreigner  11.72  13.57  14.58  12.00  12.83  14.05  12.14  12.39 
    Desires vocational change  14.48  15.36  30.11  25.45  23.40  26.58  22.54  19.57 
Family status (in %)                  
    Single  37.24  32.50  35.83  32.00  35.47  28.48  36.42  35.73 
    Married  38.62  38.57  37.19  42.55  41.13  47.34  36.42  42.37 
    Divorced  11.03  15.00  18.12  13.82  9.43  14.56  14.45  10.95 
    Living community  6.21  5.36  4.09  5.45  6.42  4.18  5.20  5.21 
    Missing  6.90  8.21  4.36  5.82  7.55  5.19  7.51  5.21 
Education (in %)                 
    No formal education  0.00  3.57  2.45  2.55  2.64  2.53  2.31  2.15 
    Compulsory school  35.86  35.71  31.61  34.55  33.58  34.81  38.73  36.45 
    Apprenticeship  33.10  26.43  25.75  29.82  22.64  32.53  19.65  29.80 
    Schooling degree with vocational qualification  11.72  8.21  9.13  5.82  10.57  10.63  9.83  9.16 
    Schooling degree with university entrance qualification  8.97  13.57  16.62  11.64  15.09  8.73  12.14  10.95 
    Academic degree  2.07  4.29  5.18  6.55  6.42  4.81  5.78  5.21 
    Missing  8.28  8.21  9.26  9.09  9.06  5.95  11.56  6.28 
Last employment                 
    Last gross earnings in Euro per day  49.14  46.40  54.60  56.38  50.68  49.74  53.18  52.43 
    Duration last employment spell in months  32.54  32.68  30.05  33.50  33.23  24.05  33.78  26.98 
Employment history (in months)                 
    Mean duration in employment 5 years before UE entry  24.34  23.55  22.15  24.91  25.59  20.46  26.15  23.42 
    Mean duration in unemployment 5 years before UE entry  2.25  2.44  2.34  1.99  1.72  2.32  1.90  1.88 
    Overall time in child care  6.58  10.55  6.19  5.46  7.13  8.00  8.04  6.38 
Fraction of entire observation period (in %)                 
    in unemployment  12.60  12.96  12.42  10.97  10.40  14.04  10.43  11.68 
    in employment  65.81  64.20  68.60  73.21  70.31  66.23  69.61  70.32 
                 
Outcomes                 
Employment after end of the sequence (in%)                 
    12 months after UE entry  26.80  15.57  21.44  35.57  25.32  29.16  23.90  29.06 
    24 months after UE entry  51.57  50.87  54.00  61.64  60.82  54.67  61.23  61.40 
    36 months after UE entry  56.17  57.66  58.18  62.06  61.44  58.15  61.08  63.42 
    48 months after UE entry  51.70  53.17  60.24  63.54  63.40  56.98  58.50  63.51 
Note:  Time invariant characteristics are measured at the entry into the defining unemployment spell. Time dependent 
variables are measured until right before the spell that defines the trimester.    13 
Table 7: Mean characteristics of selected variables per sequence - timing of the programs 
Sequence  AJS,UE,UE  UE,AJS,UE  UE,UE,AJS  UE,QM,UE  UE,UE,QM  UE,CS,UE  UE,UE,CS 
Cases  1844  2203  3387  1534  2201  828  1203 
Intermediate outcomes               
Just before the second trimester of the sequence               
    Intermediate time in employment (in months)   0.32  0.13  0.32  0.18  0.58  0.27  0.69 
    Number of transitions between UE and E  0.14  0.11  0.12  0.14  0.20  0.20  0.23 
    Share affected by intermediate employment (in %)  12.8  6.04  9.89  7.50  16.6  10.7  19.2 
    Intermediate time in 'out of labor force' (in months)  0.15  0.09  0.16  0.08  0.24  0.14  0.25 
    UB benefit exhausted (in %)  10.03  22.38  11.51  20.08  10.95  20.29  10.22 
    Cumulated job offers  2.30  2.54  3.71  2.05  2.75  2.33  2.23 
    Pregnant just before defining state (in %)  0.92  0.36  0.00  1.17  0.05  0.24  0.00 
Just before the third trimester of the sequence               
    Intermediate time in employment (in months)  0.88  0.37  0.38  0.41  0.72  0.62  0.86 
    Number of transitions between UE and E  0.40  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.41  0.34  0.47 
    Share affected by intermediate employment (in %)  25.7  13.8  11.6  13.6  20.5  18.7  23.7 
    Intermediate time in 'out of labor force' (in months)  0.30  0.20  0.20  0.17  0.30  0.22  0.32 
    UB benefit exhausted (in %)  27.01  31.23  77.47  28.42  65.65  32.61  62.34 
    Cumulated job offers  4.25  3.30  5.65  2.73  4.88  3.06  4.24 
    Pregnant just before defining state (in %)  1.79  0.73  0.47  1.50  0.64  0.60  0.50 
               
Time invariant characteristics               
Personal characteristics (in %)               
Female  49.46  44.53  45.08  61.99  55.43  50.48  47.71 
Age at UE entry (in years)  37.36  37.80  37.99  37.08  36.78  37.09  36.85 
Foreigner  21.96  24.10  20.22  14.60  14.90  16.55  14.13 
Desires vocational change  34.22  29.96  26.66  21.90  22.72  20.05  18.62 
Family status (in %)                
    Single  28.90  28.60  31.86  31.81  33.17  31.40  36.66 
    Married  46.10  44.71  41.72  45.57  41.16  40.34  36.99 
    Divorced  15.89  14.66  16.00  11.60  14.18  14.49  13.38 
    Living community  3.74  4.68  3.75  4.50  5.13  5.07  4.49 
    Missing  4.61  6.63  5.99  5.74  5.95  8.21  8.23 
Education (in %)               
    No formal education  7.75  6.99  6.44  2.15  2.54  1.81  3.82 
    Compulsory school  27.44  29.23  29.61  36.64  36.89  35.39  32.17 
    Apprenticeship  35.90  38.36  40.21  30.18  31.03  28.02  30.67 
    Schooling degree with vocational qualification  4.93  4.54  4.99  10.43  8.81  7.00  8.06 
    Schooling degree with university entrance qual.  12.69  7.67  8.80  10.63  10.59  11.35  11.22 
    Academic degree  3.15  4.72  3.66  3.46  4.23  5.56  6.15 
    Missing  8.13  8.49  6.29  6.52  5.86  10.87  7.90 
Last employment               
    Last gross earnings in Euro per day  51.96  52.63  51.45  50.27  52.20  53.81  53.91 
    Duration last employment spell in months  23.70  27.87  27.98  29.34  26.31  30.54  27.75 
Employment history (in months)               
    Mean duration in employment 5 y. before UE entry  18.87  21.73  21.18  22.98  20.90  24.19  22.28 
    Mean duration in unemployment 5 y. before UE entry  3.18  3.01  3.83  2.39  2.80  2.11  2.47 
    Overall time in child care  5.16  5.36  6.76  9.54  8.41  7.11  6.53 
Fraction of entire observation period (in %)               
    in unemployment  15.43  15.57  17.18  12.88  14.59  11.99  14.00 
    in employment  67.30  67.36  65.09  66.90  65.77  68.84  66.33 
               
Outcomes               
Employment after end of the sequence (in%)               
    12 months after UE entry  22.22  22.13  4.99  23.79  4.84  25.78  8.49 
    24 months after UE entry  49.50  48.12  38.85  54.43  39.87  57.54  45.09 
    36 months after UE entry  50.08  51.52  43.75  57.18  49.40  60.77  56.36 
    48 months after UE entry  50.52  51.46  44.28  59.03  52.97  61.60  56.82 
Note: Time invariant characteristics are measured at the entry into the defining unemployment spell. Time dependent variables are measured until 
right before the spell that defines the trimester.   14 
As far as the timing of the programs is concerned, we find some general features for all se-
quences under consideration.  First, the fraction of female participants decreases as the time 
prior to program participation increases. The fraction of singles, in turn, increases for later 
program starts. Second, participants in a program at a later stage have the highest fraction of 
exhausted benefit claims before the start of the trimester compared to earlier participants. 
Over 60 percent of the participants in the last trimester have exhausted their benefit claims. 
Third, participants in the second trimester have the lowest time of intermediate employment 
until then, but also the least time out of the labor force. Participants in earlier stages of the 
sequence have higher pregnancy rates later on compared to the other participants. Participants 
in active job search in the last trimester are more likely to be skilled compared to earlier par-
ticipants of this program.  
Overall, participants in the different sequences differ with respect to time invariant character-
istics (static selection on observables), but also with respect to intermediate outcomes at one 
point of time and over time. Thus, there is dynamic selection on observables into the defining 
states of the trimesters on the basis of those variables.  
We close this section with a remark on the choice of the sequences under consideration. Since 
we face large heterogeneity with respect to program length, we require some sequences to end 
with a trimester in unemployment, if population size allows. By means of this, we guarantee 
that programs end within the sequence so that both participation groups take part in programs 
with similar length, which excludes that we compare very short with long measures. Devia-
tions from this rule are explicitly mentioned and solely due to population size restrictions. In 
principle, one could skip the last trimester and compare for example (QM,QM) with (QM,UE) 
or just (QM), again for different subpopulations. However, the degree of heterogeneity with 
respect to the program length and type would increase, which would make the interpretation   15 
of the estimated effects even harder, given that we are unable to distinguish certain types of 
qualification measures or course subsidies. 
4  Estimation 
The estimator that is used in this study to compute the effects of all pair-wise comparisons of 
sequences of interest is the inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator as used in Lechner 
(2007). Recall that since the participants in both sequences under consideration in any pair-
wise comparison differ from the target population, it is not possible to observe the post-se-
quence outcomes for the latter directly in the data because of the dynamic selection issue ex-
plained in section 3.2. Thus, the estimation strategy is to re-weight the outcomes of those in-
dividuals who experienced an entire sequence in order to mimic the target population with 
respect to all characteristics that determine selection and outcomes at all relevant selection 
stages, i.e. t1 and t2 in the simplified world used as example in Section 3.2. Using composite 
weights of choice probabilities solves the selection problem. Those weights are proportional 
to the inverse of a product of sequential probabilities of having experienced a component of 
the sequence conditional on what happened before. Taking the sequence (0,1) as an example, 
this would be the conditional probability of participating in the program at t2  given non-par-
ticipation in t1 multiplied by the conditional probability of non-participation in t1 . Note that 
the underlying population for the estimation of the participation probabilities changes at every 
selection step. Suppose we want to re-weight the persons in the sequence (0,1) towards a tar-
get population (1) defined in t1 . The probability of being a member of (1) is computed on the 
entire population, i.e. all individuals in t1 who are either in the program (1) or not (0).
8 The 
probability of participating in t2 conditional on non-participation in t1 is only computed on the 
subpopulation of non-participants in t1, i.e. all individuals who are a member of (0,0) or (0,1). 
                                            
8  For this example, this automatically determines the probability of not being in the target population, i.e. being a member 
of (0) in t1.   16 
Lechner (2007) shows that under standard regularity conditions of GMM such an estimator is 
N
1/2-consistent and asymptotically normally distributed for a parametric estimator of the se-
lection probabilities.
9  
Another component of the WDCIA, not mentioned so far, is the common support condition. 
Every member in one of the three populations under inspection, i.e. the two sequences and the 
target population, is required to have an identical counterpart with respect to the participation 
probability per sequence. By means of this, we create a homogeneous set of individuals who 
could have taken part in any of the sequences with comparable propensity scores. Finally, to 
account for the sensitivity issue with IPW estimation concerning observations with very large 
weights, we trim those individuals with the largest 1 and 5 percent of weights, again, per se-
quence and check our results for robustness.   
The propensity scores, used for the calculation of the weights, are estimated by means of bi-
nary probit models for every step of the dynamic selection. For each selection step, we in-
clude a fixed set of variables that comprises variables capturing gender, being a foreigner, 
disability status, age, vocational degree, wish for a vocational change, last income, as well as 
summary variables of the labor market history, and regional indicators. Each specification is 
tested for omitted variables stepwise and augmented by time varying or intermediate out-
comes if the respective tests indicate to do so.  
                                            
9   Results of a sequential matching procedure as discussed in a previous version of Lechner (2007) are available on request. 
There are only small differences between the results of the matching and the IPW approach. Robins and coauthors suggest 
alternative estimators in various papers.   Table 8: Results of the propensity score estimation - three selected comparisons 
   AJS  (AJS,QM)  (QM,AJS)  (UE,QM)  (UE,QM,UE)  (UE,UE,QM)  AJS  (AJS,UE)  (AJS,UE,UE)  (UE,UE)  (UE,UE,AJS) 
   vs.  if  if  vs.  if  if  vs.  vs.  if  if  if 
Variable  QM  AJS  QM  (UE,UE)  (UE,QM)  (UE,UE)  UE  AJS  (AJS,UE)  UE  (UE,UE) 
Female        +    +  +      +  - 
Disabled  -  -  +  +    +  +    -  +   
Foreigner  -          -  -    -  -   
Age at UE entry  +    +  -  +  +  +  -  +  +  + 
No vocational degree  -  -        -  +      +  + 
University entrance qualification and academic degree  +      -    -  +    +  +   
Wish for vocational change  +      +    +  +      +  + 
Month of pregnancy *              -         
Overall time in child care  -        +  +  +      +   
Last earnings      +              +   
UB claim expired*    -    -  +      +  -  +   
Mean duration                        
    in employment 2 years before UE entry  -      +    +  -      +  + 
    in unemployment 2 years before UE entry  +      -    -      +  +  + 
Regional indicators                       
    UE rate        -    -        +   
    industrial region            +        -   
    Touristic region  +      +      +  +    -   
Intermediate outcomes*                       
Until start of the second treatment of seq,                       
    intermediate time in employment (months)   A    -  -  -  +  A  +  +  -  + 
    Number of transitions from UE to E  A      +  +  +  A  -  +  -  + 
    Interm. time in 'out of labor force' (months)  A  -    -  -  +  A  +  +  -  + 
    UB benefit exhausted (in %)  A  +    +  -  -  A  -  +  -  - 
    cumulated job offers  A  -    -  -  +  A  +  -  +  + 
    month of pregnancy   A  -    -    -  A  +    +   
Until start of the third treatment of the seq.                       
    Interm. time in employment (months)  A  A  A  A  +  -  A  A    A  - 
    Number of transitions from UE to E  A  A  A  A  -  -  A  A  -  A  - 
    Interm. time in 'out of labor force' (months)  A  A  A  A  +  -  A  A  -  A  - 
    UB benefit exhausted (in %)  A  A  A  A    +  A  A  +  A  + 
    cumulated job offers  A  A  A  A  +    A  A  +  A   
    month of pregnancy   A  A  A  A  +     A  A     A  - 
    Note:  We estimate probit models for each selection step.  We do not report the value of the coefficients, since they are only identified up to scale and thus not comparable between the 
  different models. + (-) denotes that the respective variable has a positive (negative) coefficient in the index for the participation probability that is significant on the 5% level. (A) Variable is 
  not exogenous at the beginning of the defining spell of each trimester. (*) Variables are measured right before the defining spell of the trimester. Reading example 1: For the selection into 
  AJS compared to QM, we find a positive influence of age on the probability of participating in AJS. Reading example 2: For the selection into (AJS,QM) given the participation in AJS, we 
  find a negative coefficient of exhausted benefit claims on the probability of getting subsequent QM.  Blanks either denote that the respective coefficients are zero or that the variable is not 
  part of the selection probit.  Time  invariant  covariates  play  a  key  role  for  the  selection  in  the  earlier  phase  of  the 
sequences.  Some  of  them,  e.g.  gender,  disability,  vocational  degree,  or  the  wish  for  a 
vocational  change,  appear  to  have  a  more  sustainable  impact  also  in  later  stages  of  the 
sequence. However, we observe that as time moves on, selection is driven by intermediate 
outcomes,  like  intermediate  employment,  intermediate  times  in  OLF,  exhausted  benefit 
claims, cumulated job offers or pregnancies. We report estimation results of the selection 
probit  models  for  selected  variables  for  three  complete  comparisons  (AJS,  QM)  vs. 
(QM,AJS), (UE,QM,UE) vs. (UE,UE,QM), and (AJS,UE,UE) vs. (UE,UE,AJS) in Table 8. 
All other probit results are available from the authors on request, but suppressed for the sake 
of brevity and readability. 
5  Results  
5.1   Timing of active labor market programs 
This section illustrates our estimation results dealing with the timing of some active labor 
market programs in Austria - active job search, qualification measures, and course subsidies. 
We estimate the effects of timing for various outcome variables (we use indicator variables 0 
and 1 for employment and unemployment and earnings in Euro) and trimming levels, but we 
restrict our graphical presentation to the effect on unemployment for the 5 percent trimming 
level for the sake of brevity. All other relevant estimation results that are discussed are sum-
marized in the internet appendix. The sequences under consideration and the target population 
are given in the first line of every graph. All outcome variables are averaged over each tri-
mester. We measure the effects starting from the first trimester after the end of the respective 
sequences onwards. The time is measured in trimesters and years, where e.g. 1/3 denotes the 
first trimester in the third year after the initial entry into unemployment between 2000 and 
2002. Since we face non-negligible attrition at the end of the follow-up period, we separate   19 
the last three trimesters by a dashed line and very much down weight them in the interpreta-
tions of our findings. A symbol on the curves indicates that the respective effect is significant 
at the 5 percent level. 
Figure 2 reports the effects of allocating programs in the first trimester after the initial unem-
ployment entry compared to the allocation of the same program in the second trimester. We 
measure this effect by comparing sequence (P, UE, UE) to sequence (UE, P, UE), as well as 
sequences (P, UE) compared to sequence (UE, P, UE) where P denotes some of the programs. 
First, note that, as mentioned before, we require a period of unemployment after the program 
to ensure that program durations are comparable. Furthermore, also note that in both types of 
comparisons we focus on individuals not working in the first two periods. Finally, using se-
quences of equal length has the advantage that the comparison is made of a comparable inter-
val over which we require participants in both sequences not to work. However, it has the 
disadvantage of taking away some of program effects of the (P, UE, UE) sequence as partici-
pants in that sequence are unemployed two periods after the program whereas participants in 
(UE, P, UE) are only unemployed one period after the sequence. Below we show the results 
for comparisons based on sequences of equal length and report on the other comparison when 
there are differences. 
With respect to starting a program in the first or the second trimester of the unemployment 
spell, we do not find any persistent effects. This holds for all programs and target populations 
under consideration - active job search, qualification measures, and course subsidies.   20 
Figure 2: Program participation in the first versus the second trimester - effect on unemployment in % 
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Note:   AJS: active job search, QM: qualification measure, CS: course subsidy.  
The results changes if we consider program participation in the first compared to the third 
trimester (Figure 3).  We observe strong negative effects on unemployment right at the begin-
ning of the follow-up period in favor of early program allocation for all programs. 
However, such effects only occur because some of the individuals, who receive the program 
in the third trimester, are either still in the program for some time or participate in another 
program immediately after the first program at the beginning of the follow-up period. This so-
called lock-in effect is also observed in the static treatment literature, e.g. van Ours (2004).
 In 
principle, one could eliminate this lock-in effect from the estimation by comparing, for exam-
ple, (QM,UE,UE) with (UE,UE,QM,UE). However, conditioning also on the fourth trimester 
would reduce the number of participants substantially and leads to small sample problems. 
The lock in effect is more pronounced for the longer programs, like qualification measures, 
and less visible for the shorter programs, like active job search (qualification measures and 
course subsidies may last more than one year, whereas the duration of active job search pro-
grams is usually below 100 days).    21 
Ignoring the fifth year after the initial unemployment entry, we observe that for active job 
search and qualification measures the unemployment reduction of the earlier program partici-
pation does not vanish, but stabilizes at a level of about -5 to -10 percent after three years. 
This can no longer be explained by the lock-in effect given average program durations of far 
less than one year for all programs. For course subsidies we do not observe such longer-term 
effects. 
Figure 3: Program allocation in first versus third trimester - effect on unemployment in % 
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Note:   AJS: active job search, QM: qualification measure, CS: course subsidy.  
In Figures 2 and 3, we condition on two trimesters of unemployment after a program in the 
initial trimester for symmetry reasons of the sequences. In doing so, we artificially restrict the 
compositions of the members in the first sequence to those individuals who fail to reenter the 
labor market in months 4 to 8 after the program. Hence, as mentioned before we also checked 
all the latter comparisons for sequences of only one UE trimester after the program, i.e. for 
instance (AJS,UE) versus (UE,UE,AJS) or (QM,UE) versus (UE,QM,UE). As expected, we 
estimate larger effects in favor of early program allocation for all programs since, for exam-
ple, (QM,UE) contains more individuals who find a job in the third trimester after the initial 
UE entry than (QM,UE,UE) by construction.    22 
Figure 4 shows the comparison of program allocations in the second trimester with an alloca-
tion in the third trimester. We again observe that earlier allocation significantly decreases sub-
sequent unemployment after four years by 6-10 percent for all programs and target popula-
tions. The size of the effects after 3 to 4 years is similar compared to those presented in Figure 
3. However, Figure 4 features a wider range of significant effects as the number of observa-
tions is larger in this case (see Table 7).  
Figure 4: Program allocation in second versus third trimester - effect on unemployment in % 
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Note:   AJS: active job search, QM: qualification measure, CS: course subsidy.  
The effects on employment are rather similar but not identical to those on unemployment 
(though with the reverse sign) since we also observe times out of the labor force, i.e. neither 
employment nor unemployment. The effects on earnings are closely related to those on em-
ployment as earnings are only observed if a person is employed. For a more detailed treatment 
of earnings effects see Lechner and Melly (2007). The respective results are shown in the 
internet appendix. 
5.2  Order and multiple allocation of active labor market programs 
Now, we broaden the focus from the issue of when to participate in a single program to the 
issue of ordering programs of different kinds as well as multiple program participations. As   23 
discussed earlier, it is quite difficult to find a sufficiently large group of individuals who re-
ceive the same type of program, in the same order, and with similar periods between the pro-
grams even on the basis of a 4-month window. However, the extent of the data still allows us 
to define a set of sequences to answer the question of how (often) certain types of active labor 
market programs should be allocated.  
Figure 5: Order of active labor market programs - orientation and qualification measures 
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Note:   AJS: active job search, QM: qualification measure. Dotted curve: Non-negligibly, we observe employment partially 
with missing earnings information. In order to include earnings in our analysis, we recode missing earnings as zero 
and construct a dummy variable with value one whenever we observe such a case and estimate the impact of a 
sequence on the latter. We then rescale the weighted sum per sequence and report the difference to assess the 
magnitude of the error that occurs. In general, our interpretation is not much affected by this issue. For a more 
elaborate treatment of earnings effects see again Lechner and Melly (2007). 
Figure 5 illustrates the results of comparing participation in active job search measures before 
and after a qualification program - (AJS,QM) vs. (QM,AJS) - for those individuals who either 
got QM or AJS in the initial trimester. For both populations we find significant lock-in effects 
in terms of employment at the beginning of the follow-up period for the reasons mentioned 
before.
10 For AJS participants in the initial trimester we find that participation in active job 
search after a qualification measure rather than before such measure decreases unemployment 
                                            
10  Defining  these  sequences  up  to  the  third  trimester,  i.e.  (AJS,QM,UE)  versus  (QM,AJS,UE),  reduces  the  number  of 
participants to a level that is no longer sufficient for the semi-parametric IPW estimator to deliver reliable results. Hence, 
we can not exclude remaining asymmetries, in the sense that some participants in (AJS,QM) have longer qualification 
measures than those participants in (QM,AJS) who experience programs <= 4 months by construction.   24 
four years after the initial unemployment entry significantly by 8 percent. This indicates that 
active job search programs should be employed when reemployment chances are potentially 
higher,  i.e.  after  having  participated  in  a  qualification  measure,  instead  of  using  it  as  a 
standard screening instrument per se before potential further programs. We find similar but 
insignificant effects for initial QM participants. Doing the same exercise for orientation meas-
ures either before or after a qualification measure does not lead to significant results. 
Figure 6: Multiple allocation of active labor market programs - qualification measures 
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Note: UE: Unemployment, QM: qualification measure. Dotted curve: see Figure 5. 
Figure 6 shows the effect of a single qualification measure in the initial trimester compared to 
a qualification measures in the first as well as in the second trimester for both subpopulations 
for whom such an effect is identified with the sequential randomization assumption, i.e. par-
ticipants of only one or two qualification measures.
11 For both target populations, we find that 
double-qualification has a positive effect on employment compared to a single qualification 
program, though being insignificant almost everywhere. Using unemployment as the outcome 
variable of interest does not yield additional insights. As far as earnings are concerned, we 
find that individuals, who received only one qualification, would have experienced a signifi-
                                            
11  Longer  programs  are  not  counted  as  two  single  programs  in  two  subsequent  trimesters,  but  are  excluded  from  this 
comparison.   25 
cant increase in gross earnings per month of about 160-250 Euros had they been treated twice. 
However, this effect vanishes approximately three years after the initial UE entry. This holds 
also for the target population that has been treated twice, but only until the first trimester of 
the third year after the initial UE entry. Unfortunately, the data at hand do not allow distin-
guishing qualification measures further which makes it hard to derive explicit policy conclu-
sions for this comparison. We did not find significant effects for multiple grants of course 
subsidies compared to single grants. 
5.3  Sensitivity Checks 
As a first sensitivity check, we reduce the trimming level to 1 percent. We observe that in 
many cases the curves become choppier and less significant. The reason is that some persons 
in a sequence receive extreme weights (who are excluded at the 5% level but included at the 
1% level) basically determine the weighted sum of outcomes of the entire population of the 
sequence. However, the broad picture of all previous results does not depend on the trimming 
level.  Lechner  (2007)  also  proposes  a  sequential  matching  estimator  for  the  DATE(T). 
Applying this estimator in the current analysis leads to qualitatively similar conclusions.  
One result of the selection analysis in Table 8 was that the allocation into the next period of a 
sequence is significantly determined by intermediate outcomes which are in turn influenced 
by earlier periods of the sequence under inspection. This constitutes evidence that it is rele-
vant to control for such dynamics by imposing the WDCIA instead of the static CIA, which 
ignores selection based on intermediate outcomes. We check the relevance of the WDCIA in 
two further ways: In Figure 9 we show how the results would change if we ignore the dy-
namic selection based on intermediate outcomes by dropping the latter and incorporating only 
those control variables into the selection probits that are exogenous right before the first se-
lection. In that figure the solid lines represent the effects of the previous section based on the 
WDCIA, whereas the dashed lines represent the results when we ignore the dynamic selection   26 
issue, and the symbols on the curves again denote significance at the 5% level. In the left 
panel we reconsider the comparison of using active job search before or after a qualification 
measure. It can be observed that ignoring the selection between different stages of a sequence 
leads to an overestimation of the initial lock-in effects. Furthermore, we no longer detect that 
using active job search after a qualification program performs better in reducing unemploy-
ment compared to the reverse order four years after the initial unemployment entry. 
Figure 9: Checking the relevance of the WDCIA - selection models based only on control variables 
that are exogenous before the first period 
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Note:  UE: Unemployment, AJS: active job search, QM: qualification measure. We denote the effects that were estimated 
without the intermediate outcomes by a dotted line. Symbols on the curves denote again significance at the 5% level. 
Solid lines represent the effects of the previous section, i.e. based on the WDCIA, whereas dashed lines represent 
the results that ignore the dynamic selection issue. 
In the second panel, we see that the estimated effects on unemployment of participating in a 
qualification program once rather than twice turn out to be 3-4 percent lower when intermedi-
ate outcomes are ignored. The same holds for the right panel where the estimated effects for 
the timing of active job search are up to 10-35 Euros per month lower.  
The results in Figure 10 are based on the assumption that the intermediate outcomes are ex-
ogenous and are thus valid control variables for the selection into the sequences. In this case, 
the dynamic selection problem collapses to a static problem of entering one of the sequences. 
The sequences can then be compared directly ignoring the dynamics of the selection process 
by using a static evaluation approach with all intermediate outcomes as control variables. In 
all three panels we find that the size of the effects changes once we impose that assumption.   27 
Under the stronger selection assumption the order of active job search and qualification meas-
ures has no impact on employment in the longer-term and earlier timing of active job search 
seems to have a much smaller effect on earnings compared to the estimator valid under the 
weaker sequential independence assumption. 
Figure 10: Checking the relevance of the WDCIA - selection models based on all control variables 
that are observed until the last selection step 
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Note:  UE: Unemployment, AJS: active job search, QM: qualification measure. We denote the effects that were estimated 
without the intermediate outcomes by a dotted line. Symbols on the curves denote again significance at the 5% level. 
Solid lines represent the effects of the previous section, i.e. based on the WDCIA, whereas dashed lines represent 
the results that ignore the dynamic selection issue. 
Finally, we find that accounting for the dynamic selection into different phases of a sequence 
matters for two reasons. First, it helps to get a better understanding of the dynamic selection 
within a sequence. Second, it has a clear impact on the magnitude of the estimated dynamic 
treatment effects under consideration.  
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper deviates from the traditional (static) concept of evaluating single program partici-
pation versus nonparticipation or participation in another program towards the concept of 
evaluating  program  sequences,  i.e.  considering  sequences  of  (multiple)  programs  partially 
interrupted by times of unemployment. We explicitly allow for sequential allocation into the 
different stages of the sequence based on previous states and intermediate outcomes. We 
employ an inverse probability weighting estimator and use large administrative data of the 
Austrian labor force.    28 
Our findings can be divided into two parts. Regarding the timing, we observe that program 
participation in active job search, qualification measures, and course subsidies in the first and 
second trimester after the initial unemployment entry performs better in terms of reducing 
unemployment compared to participating in the third trimester. This result can be reconciled 
with Sianesi (2004) for Sweden and Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) for Germany who 
also find that earlier allocation into programs is beneficial for the unemployed.  
Analyzing sequences of programs of a different or the same type, we find that active job 
search programs are more effective after a qualification measure compared to the reverse 
order. This is intuitive given the purpose of active job search. We find no evidence for effects 
of the order of orientation and qualification measures. In addition, we find that a sequence of 
two  qualification  measures  in  the  first  and  second  trimester  performs  better  in  terms  of 
earnings four years after the initial unemployment entry compared to only one qualification 
program in the initial trimester. Our sensitivity checks illustrate that the estimated effects of 
some sequences change considerably once we ignore the dynamic selection issue. 
The unique information content and size of our data allowed us to gain a first set of answers 
to questions of how programs should be timed and how often or in what order they should be 
allocated. Extensions to a wider range of programs or sequences with other program constel-
lations are interesting. They are left for future research as even in our data the respective sub-
samples become too small for a reliable semiparametric analysis.  
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